Rules of Inference: A Study in Early Analytic Philosophy
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Summary of the Disertation
Part I: Inference in Frege and Russell
1. Frege’s Conception of Inference
1.1. Inference, Elucidation, and Useful Nonsense
1.2. The Holism of Frege’s Elucidations of Inference
1.2.1. Inference and Content
1.2.2. Truth and Justification
1.3. Inexpressible or Expressible?
1.4. The Force of Inference
1.5. Inference and Normativity
1.6. Conclusion: Towards a Resolute Reading of Frege
2. Frege’s Rules of Inference
2.1. The Inexpressibility of Rules of Inference
2.2. The Elucidations of Rules of Inference
2.3. The Methodological Role of the Rules of Inference
2.4. The Economy of Rules
2.5. The Content of Rules and Laws
2.6. Conclusion: The Tension in Frege
Appendix A: Frege’s Terminology and its Philosophical Significance
Appendix B: Three Lists of Rules in Frege
Appendix C: Rules Not Explicitly Stated by Frege
Appendix D: Frege’s Reduction of Aristotelian Modes of Inference
3. Russell on Rules of Inference
3.1. Carroll’s Puzzle
3.2. Russell’s Response: “Implication Must be Simply Perceived”
3.2.1.1. Principles of Mathematics (1): ‘Imply’ and ‘Therefore’
3.2.1.2. Principles of Mathematics (2): The Problem of Instantiation
3.2.2. “Theory of Implication”
3.2.3. Principia Mathematica
3.3. Russell vs. Wittgenstein on Logical Form
3.4. The Lingering Ambiguity of ‘Imply’
3.5. Conclusions
Part II: Inference in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
4. Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the Rules of Inference
4.1. ‘Schlussgesetze’: Rules or Laws?
4.2. The Rejection of Rules of Inference: Texts and Contexts
4.3. Standard and Non-Standard Readings of Tractatus 5.132
4.4. The Real Problem in Frege’s and Russell’s Accounts of Inference
4.5. Conclusion
5. Saying and Showing
5.1. Resolute and Irresolute Approaches to Saying and Showing
5.2. Showing and Elucidating
5.2.1. On Concept and Object
5.2.2. Tractarian Elucidation
5.2.3. Formal Concepts
5.3. Why Can’t What is Shown be Said? The Third Man Argument
5.3.1. Plato’s TMA
5.3.2. The Argument for the Relative Distinction
5.3.3. The Argument for the Absolute Distinction
5.3.4. Wittgenstein’s vs. Plato’s TMA
5.3.5. Alternative 1: Rejecting Outsideness
5.3.6. Alternative 2: Rejecting Universality
5.3.7. The Resolute Reading of the Absolute Distinction
5.4. Conclusion: Logical Form Shows Itself, But it Cannot be Said
6. Logical Form and the Rejection of Rules of Inference
6.1. Logical Form and Understanding
6.2. What Tautologies Say, and What They Show
6.3. “Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs”
6.4. The Senselessness of Rules of Inference
6.5. The Superfluity of Rules of Inference
6.6. The Nonsensicality of Rules of Inference
6.7. Conclusion
7. Conclusion
Bibliography
List of Abbreviations
List of Sources